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United States v. Singleton and the Witness Gratuity 
Statute: What Is the Best Approach for the Criminal 
Justice System?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics pro-
vide that a lawyer cannot induce favorable testimony from a witness in 
exchange for something of value. 1 Most states have similar provisions? 
The United States Code contains a similar provision which prohibits the 
exchange of something of value for testimony? Despite this provision 
(known as the witness gratuity statute), the Department of Justice has 
made a regular practice of paying prosecution witnesses for testimony, 
either with monetary payments or recommendations for lenient sen-
tences.4 For example, the FBI paid Emad Salem $1,056,200 for his testi-
mony in the terrorism trial of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who was 
charged with plotting to bomb the United Nations.5 This statute has been 
applied to defense attorneys for awarding something of value to their 
witnesses but courts have refused to apply the statute to prosecutors 
when they give something of value to prosecution witnesses.6 The issue 
of the applicability of this statute to federal prosecutors came to the fore-
front in a case before the Tenth Circuit in 1998.7 The decision evoked a 
nationwide response8 and even inspired Hollywood.9 
Copyright © 2000 by Melissa Rawlinson. 
I. See Alexander J. Menza, Witness Immunity: Unconstitutional, Unfair, Unconscionable, 9 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 505, 534 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 
7-109(c) (1980)). 
/d. 
2. See, e.g., KANSAS RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4b. 
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c)(2) (1994). It states: 
Whoever directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, 
for or because of testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person 
as a witness upon a trial ... before any court ... shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned for not more than two years, or both. 
4. See J. Richard Johnston, Why is it OK for the Prosecution, but not the Defense?, II 
CRIM. JUST. 21 (1997). 
5. See id. 
6. See United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298 (6"' Cir. 1983); United States v. Barrett, 505 
F.2d 1091 (7'" Cir. 1974); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Illl972). 
7. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (IO"' Cir. 1998). 
8. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle & David E. Rovella, Stunning Rulings Curtail Prosecutors' 
227 
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On July I 0, 1998, a three-judge panel issued an opinion for the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, unanimously over-
turning the conviction of Sonya Singleton for money laundering. 10 The 
panel became the first to apply the witness gratuity statute to federal 
prosecutors. 11 Traditionally, courts had been reluctant to apply the stat-
ute, which prohibits the giving of anything of value for testimony, to fed-
eral prosecutors. 12 The panel first reasoned that the statute applied to as-
sistant United States attorneys and then went on to hold that prosecutors' 
offers of nonprosecution or intervention at sentencing were things of 
value, as prohibited by the statute. 13 Accordingly, because the govern-
ment's chief witness against Ms. Singleton had been offered something 
for his testimony, the Tenth Circuit held that Ms. Singleton's conviction 
had been obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). 14 
In response to this decision, prosecutors from coast to coast por-
trayed it as the death knell of the present criminal justice system. 15 Im-
mediately following the decision, legislation to amend the statute was in-
troduced in the Senate. 16 Within seventy days, nineteen federal district 
courts had published opinions dealing with the issue. 17 Criminal defen-
dants all over the country moved to suppress the testimony of chief wit-
nesses with the new ammunition provided by the Singleton decision. 18 
Most jurisdictions rejected the panel's interpretation, while only a couple 
d d h . . 19 a opte t etr reasonmg. 
Almost immediately, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit vacated the panel's decision, sua sponte, and ordered are-
hearing before the Tenth Circuit en banc.20 The Tenth Circuit issued a 
Power, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at AI; Bruce Fein, Fairer Trials ... or Roadblocks", WASH. 
TIMES, July 14, 1998, at Al8; Plea Bargains as 'Bribery,' DET. NEWS, July 31, 1998 at AIO. 
9. The issue inspired a Law and Order episode involving the FBI's payment to a witness. 
10. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
II. See id. 
12. See United States v. Barrett, 505 F.2d 1091 (7u' Cir. 1974); United States v.lsaacs, 347 F. 
Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
13. See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1350. 
14. See id. at 1351. 
15. See Jus tin M. Lungstrum, United States v. Singleton: Bad Law Made in the Name (if a 
Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 749 (1999). 
16. See id. at 749. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 750. 
19. See id. (citing United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 166 
F. 3d 1119 (II'" Cir. 1999)); United States v. Mays, No. 97CR 127 (E. D. Tenn. 1998), cited in United 
States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Fraguela, No. Crim.A. 96-
339, 1998 WL560352, at* I (E.D. La. 1998), vacated, No. Crim.A. 96- 339, 1998 WL 910219, at *2 
(E.D. La. 1998). 
20. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (lOth Cir. 1999) (en bane). 
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new opinion in January of 1999 with a completely different outcome. 21 
The majority found that the statute did not apply to assistant United 
States attomeys.22 As a result, the court did not have to address the issue 
of whether offerings of non prosecution or intervention constituted some-
thing of value. The new decision rested on a strained interpretation of the 
term "whoever.'m However, the decision saved the long-standing prac-
tice of obtaining key testimony in exchange for leniency. The concurring 
opinions offered a different rationale for maintaining the tradition-other 
statutes protected the practice.24 The dissent in this opinion consisted of 
the judges who issued the original opinion that was vacated.25 
This casenote will address the issue of whether or not the first opin-
ion had it right or whether the majority or concurring opinions in the en 
bane decision were right. It will also address the policy implications of 
both holdings. Section II of this casenote will provide a background into 
the practice of exchanging leniency for testimony and a background into 
the creation of the witness gratuity statute. Section III will outline the 
facts and reasoning behind Singleton I. Section N will outline reasoning 
of Singleton ll. Section V provides analysis into the ultimate issue of 
which panel had the right decision, based on both legal rationale and 
public policy reasons. Section V will also include a discussion of possi-
ble solutions to the issue. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Tradition of Exchanging Leniency for Testimony 
The Singleton I court condemned a time-honored prosecutorial tool 
of offering leniency and intervention for testimony. The practice of ex-
changing leniency for testimony dates back centuries to England where 
English Justices of the Peace would agree to nonprosecution of defen-
dants in return for their assistance in prosecuting their confederates.26 
Continuing the practice, early American prosecutors utilized the assis-
tance of co-conspirators in prosecuting one another. "By 1878, this in-
formal immunity arrangement-which allowed prosecutors to control 
whether a defendant could obtain leniency-but not the extent of that le-
niency, had become quite prevalent in the United States."27 The Supreme 
21. See id. at 1298. 
22. See id. at 1301. 
23. See id. at 1299. 
24. See id. at 1302-08. 
25. See id. at 1308. 
26. See Lungstrum, supra note 15, at 751. 
27. !d. at 752 (quoting Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 85 
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Court in the Whiskey Casei8 considered the validity of a defendant's 
plea agreement. While evaluating the facts, the Court noted that it was 
well established that an accomplice may avoid prosecution for the same 
offense if willing to testify against his associates.29 Prior to organized po-
lice forces, accomplice testimony was even more valuable than it is today 
and accomplices received greater benefits for their testimony?0 Now, the 
traditional awards of clemency or immunity have largely been replaced 
by pleas to less serious charges.31 However, this change in rewards in no 
way diminishes the importance of the testimony. In a more recent case, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that "[n]o 
practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice 
of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for 
which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a 
plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence.'m 
Offering leniency has an established place in the common law tradi-
tion of our criminal justice system. The court in Singleton II recognized 
such tradition and seemingly based a large majority of their analysis on 
the established tradition. The court found that the common law tradition 
had "created a vested sovereign prerogative in the government.''33 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c)(2) 
Known as the witness gratuity statute, the statute expressly forbids 
giving anything of value for or because of testimony. 34 The decision in 
Singleton 1 stands for the proposition that a federal prosecutor violates 
this statute when they offer leniency or intervention in return for substan-
tial assistance in the prosecution of their associates.35 Prior to this deci-
sion, the statute had never been read this expansively.36 
After eight years of hearings and studies on the federal conflict of in-
terest and bribery statutes, Congress enacted the federal prohibition 
against witness gratuities in 1962.37 The hearings, spearheaded by the 
(1995)). 
28. 99 U.S. 594 (1878). 
29. See id. at 599. 
30. See Ian Weinstein. Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 569 
(1999). 
31. See id. 
32. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5"' Cir. 1987). 
33. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (IO"' Cir. 1999) (en Bane). 
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c)(2) (1994). 
35. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (IO"' Cir 1998). 
36. See United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298 (6"' Cir. 1983); United States v. Barrett, 505 
F.2d I 091 (7"' Cir. 1974); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. lll 1972); supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
37. See Lungstrum, supra note 15, at 754. 
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House Judiciary Committee's Antitrust Subcommittee, also included in-
put from a variety of other interested federal and non-governmental enti-
ties. Prior to 1962, the bribery statute relating to witnesses prohibited 
"payment to a witness or prospective witness before a court or before an 
officer authorized to take testimony upon an agreement or understanding 
that his testimony will be influenced thereby or that he will absent him-
self from the trial or hearing."38 The staff report proposed broadening the 
scope of section 209 to include testimony before Congress and other fed-
eral agencies. In addition, witness gratuities-things of value given for or 
because of testimony regardless of the intent of the parties-were incor-
porated into the draft witness bribery statutes.39 
In 1960, the House Antitrust committee began the first round of 
hearings on the proposed legislation.40 Twenty federal agencies submit-
ted departmental reports during these hearings.41 In addition, these agen-
cies sent representatives to testify about the effects of the proposed legis-
lation.42 Additionally, eight other federal administrative bodies testified 
and the American Bar Association scrutinized the legislation.43 The sec-
ond round of hearings solicited reports from two more federal agencies 
including the Department of Justice.44 
The statute was created with the purpose of creating uniformity in 
the federal bribery statutes.45 At the time of its creation, there were nine 
general federal bribery statutes containing a number of variations.46 It is 
important to note here that neither the witnesses nor the report suggested 
that the legislation would criminalize the customary prosecutorial prac-
tice of offering leniency for testimony.47 The legislative report, totaling 
nearly 1350 pages, made no mention of such a purpose.48 The legislation 
was adopted and codified in 18 U.S.C. § 201(h), the direct predecessor of 
section 201(c)(2).49 
38. 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1962). 
39. See Lungstrum, supra note 15, at 754. 
40. See id. at 754-55. 
41. See id. at 755. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. at 754. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. at 756. 
48. See id. at 754. 
49. See id. 
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III. SINGLETON I 
A. Facts 
In April 1992, a Wichita police detective conducted an investigation 
to determine if drug dealers were using Western Union services to trans-
fer drug money.50 His investigation uncovered a large number of wire 
transfers over $1000 which bore similar identifiers, including similar 
names, addresses, and phone numbers of senders.51 The names led au-
thorities to a group of suspected drug dealers.52 Further investigation in-
dicated that a group of men who had moved from California to Wichita 
had started the drug business.53 The dealers recruited local women to 
wire money back to California to pay for more cocaine. 54 Some of the 
women even transported drugs from California back to Wichita.55 Police 
identified defendant Sonya Singleton as one of the women who received 
and transferred money for the drug dealers.56 Her name was listed as ei-
ther the sender or recipient on eight wire transfers alleged to have been 
sent on behalf of the dealers.57 Handwriting experts confirmed the fact 
that her handwriting was present on the paperwork accompanying the 
transfers.58 Ms. Singleton was charged with multiple counts of money 
laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 59 
Before trial, Ms. Singleton filed a motion to suppress the testimony 
of one of her co-conspirators, Napoleon Douglas, who had entered into a 
plea agreement with the government. Ms. Singleton based her motion on 
the grounds that the government illegally promised Mr. Douglas "some-
thing of value"-leniency-for his testimony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
201(c)(2) and Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b), which 
prohibits offering unlawful inducements to a witness.60 The district court 
denied the motion on the basis that section 201(c)(2) did not apply to the 
government.61 As a result, Mr. Douglas testified at the trial that an assis-
tant United States attorney had promised to file a motion for a downward 
50. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10"' Cir. 1998). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. at 1344. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
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departure if he testified truthfully.62 However, in Mr. Douglas's written 
plea agreement, there was no firm promise to file such a motion, only an 
agreement that the government may file one if Mr. Douglas's coopera-
tion amounted to substantial assistance.63 
The plea agreement did state three specific promises made by the 
government to Mr. Douglas in return for his truthful testimony in federal 
or state court.64 First, the government promised not to prosecute Mr. 
Douglas for any other violations under the Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act stemming from the current investigation, with the exception 
of perjury or related offenses.65 Second, the government promised to no-
tify the sentencing court of the extent of the cooperation provided by Mr. 
Douglas.66 Finally, the government promised "to advise the Mississippi 
parole board of the nature and extent of the cooperation provided" by 
67 Mr. Douglas. 
Ms. Singleton was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine and seven counts of money laundering for which the district 
court sentenced her to forty-six months of imprisonment for each count.68 
Ms. Singleton appealed her conviction to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, which found, inter alia, that the district court 
erred in denying Ms. Singleton's motion to suppress testimony obtained 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c)(2).69 
B. The Court's Reasoning 
1. Plain language 
First, the court looked to the plain meaning of the statute to deter-
mine if there was an exemption for the government. The court began 
with the plain language because plain language "must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive."70 The court also pointed to a recent Supreme 
Court decision relying on the plain language of the federal bribery stat-
ute. In Salinas v. United States,71 the Court refused to expand the reading 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 1343. 
69. See id. 
70. /d. at 1344 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
I 02, I 08 (1980)). 
71. 522 U.S. 52 (1997). 
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of the federal bribery statute because of the plain language of the statute. 
In a later decision, Brogan v. United States, 72 the Supreme Court rejected 
a proposition that criminal statutes "do not have to be read as broadly as 
they are written," and stated: 
[I]t is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified 
language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was 
trying to remedy--even assuming that it is possible to identify 
that evil from something other than the text of the statute itself ... 
Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no 
matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so.73 
The court in this case found that the language of section 201 ( c )(2) 
could not be clearer-there is no exception for the government. In re-
sponse to the government's argument that the term 'whoever' does not 
include assistant United States attorneys, the court engaged in a discus-
sion of Nardone v. United States.74 In Nardone, the Court recognized a 
limited canon of construction, which provided that statutes do not apply 
to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text expressly 
includes the government.75 However, the limited canon only applies to 
two classes of cases: (1) cases which involve statutes that deprive the 
sovereign of a "recognized or established prerogative title or interest" 
and (2) cases in which "public officers are impliedly excluded from lan-
guage embracing person" because such a reading would "work obvious 
absurdity."76 The court reasoned that neither of the two classes were 
similar to this case.77 
An example of the first class of cases is the exemption of the sover-
eign from statutes of limitation. Two additional exceptions remove sec-
tion 201(c)(2) from this class of statutes. First, the presumption that the 
sovereign is excluded unless named does not apply "where the operation 
of the law is upon the agents or servants of the government rather than on 
the sovereign itself."78 In this case, the statute operates only on the 
agents, the assistant United States attorneys themselves, in that it limits 
what they may offer in exchange for testimony. The second additional 
exception provides that the government is subject to a statute, even if it 
infringes upon a recognized government's prerogative, if the statute's 
purpose is to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong. Nardone relied on this ex-
72. 522 U.S. 398 (1998). 
73. !d. at 403, 408. 
74. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
75. See id. at 383. 
76. !d. at 383-84. 
77. See id. 
78. !d. (quoting United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184 (1935)). 
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ception to find that federal agents were covered by the word "anyone" in 
the 1934 federal wiretap statute. 79 Section 201 ( c )(2) addresses a wrong 
that Congress intended to remedy.80 The court reasoned that if justice is 
perverted when a criminal defendant seeks to buy testimony, it is just as 
perverted when a government official attempts to do the same.81 The 
statute operates to prevent fraud upon the federal courts and, as a result, 
fits under this exception as well. 
An example of the second class of cases, where applying the statue 
to public officers would work obvious absurdity, is a speed limit applied 
to a policeman pursuing a suspect. After a discussion of common law 
tradition and legal principle, the court concluded that the application of 
section 201, rather than being an absurdity, was at the center of legal tra-
dition. The importance of preserving truthful testimony is paramount. 
The opinion stated, "[t]he judicial process is tainted and justice cheap-
ened when factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or 
money."82 
The court then considered whether applying section 201(c)(2) to fed-
eral prosecutors worked an obvious absurdity in view of the federal im-
munity statutes.83 Finding that the statutes operated in separate spheres, 
the court concluded that the statutes can operate fully and independ-
ently.84 The court noted here that if the assistant United States attorneys 
were not covered by the statutory term 'whoever' then the statute would 
not prohibit bribing a witness for testimony, which the government does 
concede is prohibited.85 The court seemed to imply that this interpreta-
tion would work an obvious absurdity. Therefore, the court concluded 
that the section does apply to federal prosecutors.86 The language makes 
no exception for the action of assistant United States attorneys.87 
The only issue left to address with regard to plain meaning was 
whether the promises made to Mr. Douglas constituted "anything of 
value" as prohibited by the statute.88 Based on the plain language, the 
court assumed the everyday meaning of the phrase. "Value" embodies 
79. See id. at 384. 
80. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1346 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
81. See id. 
82. !d. at 1347. 
83. See id. at 1348 (The federal immunity statutes are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 
(1994)). 
84. See id. 
85. See id. at 1348. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
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notions of worth, utility, and importance generally.89 Courts have recog-
nized that the phrase must be broadly construed.90 Other circuits have 
noted that the phrase is a term of art and includes tangible as well as in-
tangible items.91 The court agreed with the interpretation that the phrase 
is not limited to tangible items, specifically monetary payments, and 
cited other court rulings, precedent, and statutory purpose to support its 
interpretation.92 Based on the plain language of the statute, the court 
found that the section was violated.93 The court then moved to an analy-
sis of the structure of section 201. 
2. Structure of section 201 
The court found it persuasive that other subsections within section 
201 contain requirements of corruption and subsection (c)(2) did not.94 
For example section 201(b)(3) deliberately includes a corruptness and 
intent-to-influence requirement.95 More importantly, the predecessor to 
section 201 (c)(2) also had a requirement that the thing of value influence 
the testimony.96 The court refused to re-insert this requirement where 
Congress had left it out of the current version.97 In addition, the court 
found no clearly expressed legislative intention that contradicted the 
statute's language.98 
3. Law enforcement justification 
The court next addressed the government's vague argument that 
overriding policy justifications warranted a finding that section 201(c)(2) 
did not apply to government officials.99 "Criminal prohibitions do not 
generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of the 
law." 100 If the justification applied, conduct that violates the terms of a 
89. See id. at 1348-49. 
90. See id. at 1349 (discussing United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 622-23 (2"d Cir. 
1983)). 
91. See United States v. Nilsen, 967 F. 2d 539, 542-43 (II th Cir. 1992) (construing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 876)); United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 679-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 
1954). 
92. See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1349-50. 
93. See id. at 1351. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3) (1994)). 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 1351-52. 
99. See id. at 1352. 
100. ld. (quoting Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398,406 (1998)). 
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criminal statute is nevertheless allowed. The law enforcement justifica-
tion is generally described as follows: 
[A] peace officer, prison guard, or private citizen authorized to act 
as a peace officer may, to the extent necessary to make an arrest, 
prevent an escape, or prevent the commission of a crime, 
violate a criminal statute if the conduct which constitutes the vio-
lation is reasonably in relation to the gravity of the evil threatened 
and the importance of the interest to be furthered. 101 
The justification does not apply to this case because the action was 
not undertaken by a peace officer or one acting in that capacity and it 
was not required to make an arrest or prevent an escape or other crime. 
The justification is limited to enforcement actions, which are not at issue 
here. 
4. Precedent 
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Singleton I and//, only three 
other courts had been faced with the issue of whether section 20 I ( c )(2), 
or its immediate predecessor, applied to federal prosecutors. At this point 
in the opinion, the Tenth Circuit engaged in a thorough discussion of 
those three cases, explaining why the previous courts had failed in their 
1 h 102 attempts to proper y construe t e statute. 
In the 1972 case of United States v. Isaacs, 103 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois faced this issue. In Isaacs, 
the defendant, facing prosecution for conspiracy and various substantive 
offenses, moved for an evidentiary hearing concerning allegations that 
the United States attorney illegally obtained a business license for Ms. 
Marjorie L. Everett, a prospective witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
20l(h), the direct predecessor of section 20l(c)(2). 104 The defendant 
based his motion on the idea that such a license was an attempt to influ-
ence Ms. Everett's testimony. 105 The court's analysis at this point mis-
construes the requirements of the section-there does not need to be an 
intent to influence in order to constitute a violation of the gratuity stat-
ute.106 The statute does not include that language. Moreover, the court in 
Isaacs does not really address the issue of whether or not this statute ap-
plies to federal prosecutors. 
101. /d. (citing PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES§ 142(a) (1984)). 
102. See United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Barrett, 505 
F.2d 1091 (7"' Cir. 1974); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. lli 1972). 
103. 347 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
104. See id. at 767. 
105. See id. 
106. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1356 (lOth Cir. 1998). 
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In 1974, the issue was presented before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Barrett. 101 In Barrett, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found 
defendant Edward Barrett guilty of mail fraud, interstate travel in aid of 
racketeering enterprises, and attempting to evade income taxes. 108 The 
defendant appealed his conviction arguing, inter alia, that the govern-
ment violated the witness gratuity statute by offering exemptions from 
paying tax penalties to the prosecution's primary witness. 109 The court 
found that there was no violation because the U.S. Code authorizes the 
granting of civil immunity. 110 
The Singleton I panel disagrees with this conclusion pointing out that 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned from the faulty premise that the section 
only prohibited the giving of unauthorized items for testimony. 111 How-
ever, the statute clearly proscribed giving anything of value for testi-
mony. The Seventh Circuit ignored the plain language of the statute. Sec-
tion 201 ( c )(2) does not discriminate on the basis of what things of value 
are authorized; rather, it discriminates on the basis of whether the thing 
of value is given "for" or "because of' testimony. 112 
Finally, in 1983, the Sixth Circuit faced the issue of whether a prose-
cutor's grant of immunity violated section 20 I (h) in United States v. 
Blanton. 113 In Blanton, defendants were convicted of crimes relating to 
issuance of retail liquor licenses during the time that one of the defen-
dants, Blanton, was governor of Tennessee.114 The most important evi-
dence at trial was the videotaped deposition of Jack Ham, an immunized 
witness who received a liquor license during Blanton's tenure as gover-
nor.115 In exchange for his testimony, the government offered him immu-
nity from federal prosecution and civil tax liability. The defendants ar-
gued that the testimony should have been suppressed because the 
government gave him something of value for the testimony in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 20l(h). 116 The court rejected the defendants' argument, 
holding that the "thing of value"-a liquor license-was not given by the 
government. 117 The court reasoned that the government used only per-
107. 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1974). 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 1100. 
110. See id. at 1103. 
Ill. See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1357. 
112. See id. 
113. 700 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1983). 
114. See id. at 300. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. at 310. 
117. See id. at 311. 
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suasion and exercised no coercive power when it convinced the Alcohol 
Beverage Commission (ABC) not to revoke Ham's license. 118 In addi-
tion, the court held that it did not "give" a thing of value because it 
merely allowed the witness to hold onto what he already had. 119 
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning did not persuade the Singleton I 
court. 120 It was not the actual liquor license that was the thing of value in 
this case. 121 Clearly, the government persuading ABC to allow Mr. Ham 
to retain his license was the thing of value. 122 Accordingly, the govern-
ment agents did violate the statute by persuading ABC to allow Mr. Ham 
to retain the license in exchange for his testimony .123 The persuasion may 
have been of great value to Mr. Ham since his liquor license was such a 
lucrative part of his business. 
5. Criticism of Singleton I 
The practical ramifications of this decision were a serious threat to 
the ability of prosecutors to effectively do their jobs. Any offer of leni-
ency, intervention, or similar promises would result in criminal prosecu-
tion or suppression of relevant and necessary testimony. The panel offers 
no alternatives to the time-honored practice and does not seem to con-
sider the necessity of the practice to secure convictions of criminals. 
IV. SINGLETON II 
On July 10, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit vacated the panel's decision, sua sponte, and ordered a rehearing 
before the Tenth Circuit en banc.124 In addition to the majority opinion, 
there were two concurring opinions and a dissent. 125 Although the major-
ity's decision was necessary to retain the federal prosecutor's ability to 
exchange leniency for testimony, the majority's statutory interpretation 
was not convincing. 
A. Majority Opinion 
Ms. Singleton argued that the plain language of the statute left the 
court no other alternative than to find that the statute applies to federal 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1357 (IO"' Cir. 1998). 
121. See id. at 1358. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F. 3d 1297 (10"' Cir. 1999) (en Bane). 
125. See id. 
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prosecutors. 126 She argued that the payment of something of value gives 
incentive to lie and thus undermines the importance of truthful testimony 
in our criminal justice system.127 The government responded that to al-
low section 201 ( c )(2) to apply in this case would result in a radical de-
parture from the ingrained legal culture and would result in criminalizing 
the historic practice of offering leniency. 128 Moreover, the government 
argued, Congress could not have intended to hinder the sovereign's au-
h . . I . 129 t onty to prosecute v1o atwns. 
The majority agreed with the government's argument, finding that 
the statute fit into the two classes of statutes that Nardone held did not 
apply to the government. 13° First, applying section 201(c)(2) in this case 
would work an obvious absurdity .131 The majority based its reasoning on 
the argument that the assistant United States attorney is acting as the alter 
ego of the United States; therefore, the two cannot be separated. 132 As a 
result, the defendant is arguing that the statute applies to the United 
States and thus, like any other violator of the statute, the United States 
would be subject to criminal prosecution. 133 The majority finds this ar-
b d 134 F h h . . " h " gument a sur . · urt er, t e maJonty reasons, w oever connotes a 
being and the United States is an inanimate entity. 135 
Second, the majority finds that an application of the statute in this 
case would deprive the sovereign of a recognized and established pre-
rogative-the ability to exchange leniency for testimony. 136 The sover-
eign's prerogative to exchange testimony for leniency is ingrained in 
common law tradition. In light of this tradition, the majority presumed 
that if Congress had intended to overturn such a tradition, it would have 
d . I I 137 one so m c ear anguage. 
The majority then dismisses the argument that their decision could 
result in prosecutorial misconduct. 138 Once a prosecutor steps out of line, 
he or she is no longer working as an alter ego of the sovereign. 139 There-
fore, they become subject to the criminal prohibitions of section 
126. See id. at 1299. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 1300-0 I. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. at 1299-1300. 
133. See id. at 1300. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 130 I. 
137. See id. at 1302. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
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20l(c)(2). 140 Although there is the shibboleth that "the government is not 
above the law," it does not apply in this case because the statute does not 
0 f h 141 extst or t e government. 
B. Concurring Opinions 
1. Judge Lucero's concurrence 
Judge Lucero concurs in the judgment that the assistant United States 
attorney did not violate the statute but he disagrees with how the majority 
came to that conclusion.142 The term "whoever" can and does include the 
government and its agents. 143 The majority's interpretation of the term 
cannot be reconciled with the Nardone decision where the Supreme 
Court found that the wiretapping statute applied to federal agents. 144 The 
Court found that the statutory language in Nardone-"no person"-
connoted a being and not an entity, yet it was applied to government 
agents. 145 Moreover, the majority ignores that the term 'whoever' as used 
in other provisions of section 201 applies to government agents. 146 The 
government concedes that "whoever" in other parts of the statute apply 
to government agents. To argue that the term has a different meaning in 
one part of the statute than in another, when used in the same way, is 
nonsensical. 147 
In addition, the Nardone exceptions do not apply to the gratuity stat-
ute. The sovereign is not deprived of an interest. 148 Nardone states that 
exclusion is less stringently applied where operation of law is upon its 
agents rather than the government itself. 149 Here the operation of law is 
upon agents. Judge Lucero does not agree with the majority's classifica-
tion of Assistant United States Attorneys as the alter ego of the govern-
ment.150 
With respect to the majority's holding that application of the statute 
would work an obvious absurdity, Judge Lucero argues that the major-
ity's interpretation is the one that works an absurdity. 151 The majority's 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 1303 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
143. See id. 
144. See id. at 1304. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. at 1305. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. at 1304. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. at 1307-08. 
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holding works an absurdity by implying that a federal prosecutor who 
bribes a witness to supply false testimony is not subject to criminal pro-
hibitions of section 201(c)(2).152 Taking this analysis even further, a 
prosecutor would not be subject to prosecution for violation of this stat-
ute no matter what the bribe. 
Judge Lucero cannot join the dissent, though, because other statutes 
in the United States Code, as well as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11, allow the government to trade certain items of value for testimony. 153 
These statutes are specific statutes, while section 201(c)(2) is a general 
one.
154 It is an elementary tenet of statutory construction that specific 
statutes will not be nullified or controlled by a general one. 155 Rather, a 
specific statute controls a general one. 156 Therefore, the specific statutes 
at issue here control section 201(c)(2). 157 All of these statutes allow the 
giving of something of value for testimony. This shows congressional 
intent to allow the long-standing practice of exchanging something for 
testimony. These statutes do not allow for prosecutorial misconduct be-
cause they clearly limit the something of value that can be given fortes-
. 158 ttmony. 
2. Judge Henry 
Judge Henry finds that the concurring opinion of Judge Lucero is the 
most persuasive. 159 However, he feels it is important to note that Con-
gress has recently passed legislation requiring that government attorneys 
be subject to state ethical rules. 160 As a result, it may be helpful and rele-
vant to scrutinize the dissent's suggestions as to other tactics for effec-
tively obtaining testimony in exchange for leniency. 161 Judge Henry 
agrees with the majority opinion in that the dissent's statutory construc-
tion could work a legal absurdity. Congress could not have intended to 
criminalize the common practice of offering leniency for testimony. 162 
152. See id. at 1306. 
153. See id. at 1305-07. These statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Imposition of a sen-
tence); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (Duties of sentencing commission); 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (Immunity 
of witnesses). 
154. See id. at 1305. 
155. See id. (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 375 
(1990)). 
156. See id at 1305. 
157. See id. at 1307. 
158. See id. at 1306-07. 
159. See id. at 1302 (Henry, J., concurring). 
160. See id. 
161. See id. at 1302-03. 
!62. See id. 
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C. Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenters in this case are the three judges who issued the Single-
ton I opinion. 163 The judges remain resolute in their statutory construc-
tion and their dissenting opinion outlines the issues that they addressed in 
the first opinion. Once again they disagree with the majority based on the 
unambiguous language contained in the statute and argue that courts 
must apply the unambiguous statutes as they are written. 164 The dissent 
argues that the majority has ignored the values that section 201(c) was 
created to protect. 165 Specifically, the court has ignored the maintaining 
of integrity, fairness, and credibility of the criminal justice system.166 
Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable testimony and 
create an incentive for the accomplice to shift the blame onto the defen-
dant.167 The dissent argues that there are other ways to obtain this testi-
. h . I . h 16s mony wit out VIO atmg t e statute. 
In response to the majority's opinion that the statute, if applied, de-
prives the sovereign of a protected interest, the dissent argues that section 
201(c) does not interfere with the right to prosecute.169 Instead, it inter-
feres with "how" to prosecute, which is not a protected interest. 170 There 
are numerous limits placed on how the government may prosecute, such 
as the rules of individual courts and the rules of evidence. 171 Section 
20l(c) is not limiting the right to prosecute, only the way the government 
may do so. 
The dissent disagrees with Judge Lucero's opinion that section 
201 (c) cannot be reconciled with other statutes. 172 As far as the major-
ity's reliance on the importance of the ability of prosecutors to exchange 
testimony for leniency, the dissent counters with reliance on the constitu-
163. See id. at 1308 (Kelly, J ., dissenting). 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. See id.at 1309. 
167. See id. at 1309 (quoting Yvette A. Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent 
Plea Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 802 (1987)). 
168. For example, the dissenting judges suggest that prosecutors could enter into a plea 
agreement with a defendant under Fed.R.Crim.P. ll(e), which is not prohibited by section 201(c). 
Section 20l(c) does not prohibit plea agreements if the plea agreement is not conditioned on the de-
fendant testifying. The prosecutor could record the plea discussions to preserve the information pro-
vided by the defendant. Once the defendant has entered his guilty plea and been sentenced, the 
prosecutor could subpoena the defendant as a witness in a trial of the other participants in the crime. 
The defendant's trial testimony is not given in exchange for something of value; rather it is com-
pelled through subpoena. See id. at 1309 n. 3. 
169. See id. at 1311. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. at 1312. 
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tional principle of creating an even playing field for the defendant and 
the govemment. 173 The dissent argues that the majority's position under-
cuts that basic principle. The only way to remain faithful to the impor-
tance of providing a level playing field is to interpret section 201 ( c )(2) as 
I 0 174 app ymg to government agents. 
The importance of preserving the prosecutor's ability to exchange 
leniency for testimony may have motivated the court to come up with a 
means of protection. Although the majority did not clearly state that their 
decision was a practical interpretation determined to save the long stand-
ing practice of witness gratuity, there were hints that it was. The major-
ity's references to the long-standing tradition suggests that the majority 
recognized the importance of protecting the tradition and made their de-
cision conform. 
V. WHO GOT IT RIGHT? 
As mentioned above, the Singleton I opinion was greeted with enor-
mous criticism and skepticism, both from other courts and the legislature. 
For example, the court in United States v. Eisenhardt175 called the 
panel's decision "amazingly unsound, not to mention nonsensical," and 
found the odds that the Supreme Court would reach a similar result 
"about the same as discovering that the entire roster of the Baltimore 
Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns."176 Since this case, 
over 200 other courts have been faced with this issue. The majority of 
them disagreed with Singleton I. The refusal of other courts to adopt the 
reasoning in Singleton I suggests that the opinion in Singleton II had the 
right answer. The quick response to the original panel's decisions sug-
gests that the court understood the possible ramifications of the first de-
cisiOn. 
The majority opinion seemed very result-oriented and they seemed to 
have ignored the possibility of prosecutorial misconduct. The court ab-
solved prosecutors of any responsibility to abide by the rules as set forth 
by the statute. The decision expands the rights of the federal prosecutor 
to offer anything in exchange for testimony. Criticism of the holding is 
not a blanket condemnation of the integrity of federal prosecutors. How-
ever, it seems to create a series of inconsistencies. Federal prosecutors 
are not limited in their ability to award something of value for testimony. 
An expansion of this idea, taken from the dissent in Singleton II, is that 
173. See id. at 1313-14. 
174. See id. at 1314. 
175. 10 F. Supp. 2d 521,521-22 (D. Md. 1998). 
176. !d. 
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the waiving of applicability to federal prosecutors creates an uneven 
playing field in the courtroom. As Judge Lucero noted, the majority's 
reading of subsection (c)(2) "creates a conceptually messy legal regime 
for handling the case of the errant U.S. attomey."177 
The original decision, although problematic for public policy rea-
sons, seems to be based in sound legal reasoning. The judges, participat-
ing in the vacated decision and in the dissent, base their reasoning on the 
plain language of the statute. There is no uniform rule of statutory inter-
pretation in this country. Two courts can take a different approach to the 
same statute and come out with opposite interpretations. Singleton pro-
vides evidence of such a problem. The most helpful approach seems to 
be to look at the plain language of the statute, along with congressional 
intent. However, the three-judge panel used that form. The plain lan-
guage of the statute makes no exception for prosecutors. The three-judge 
panel argued that if Congress had intended to create such an exception, 
they should have included the language in the statute. 
Congressional intent did not assist the court in this case, either. The 
legislative history was lengthy and thorough. 178 However, there was no 
mention of this specific exception.179 The critical determination could 
come down to how one interprets congressional silence. In this case, si-
lence could have easily been construed to indicate that the exception, 
based on such a long-standing tradition, was understood to be included. 
However, it could also be construed to mean that there was no intent to 
include the exception in the statute. This seemingly helpful form of statu-
tory interpretation seems to give support to the conclusion reached in 
Singleton I. Perhaps the court in Singleton I should have included practi-
cal implications of their interpretation in their reasoning. 
Although the panel's decision was based on sound legal reasoning, 
the public policy ramifications could possibly be catastrophic. The opin-
ion seriously limited the federal prosecutor's ability to gain conviction 
using a practice that is engrained in the common law tradition of our 
criminal justice system. The panel's broad literal reading of the ban on 
witness gratuities created too many problems, and not only for prosecu-
tors. The panel's reasoning made a criminal of any judge who ever light-
ened a defendant's sentence because of the defendant's truthful testi-
mony. It also made an aider and abettor out of any defense attorney who 
ever negotiated a cooperation agreement rewarding a client for truthful 
testimony. 18° Further, critics of this decision argue that without the coop-
177. See Singleton, 165 F.3d atl308. 
178. See Lungstrum, supra note 15, at 755. 
179. See id. 
180. See David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
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eration agreements of the kind invalidated in Singleton, the government 
could not "enforce the drug laws, could not prosecute organized crime 
figures under RICO," and might not have obtained valuable testimony in 
the Oklahoma City bombing cases. 181 The judges do offer alternatives to 
obtaining testimony, which may be good alternatives. 182 However, in the 
meantime, the application of the witness gratuity statute to federal prose-
cutors would limit their ability to deal effectively with accomplices. 
One might argue that this would be a positive policy ramification. 
For example, some have argued that the cooperation of criminals in ex-
change for leniency creates serious problems in the federal justice sys-
tem, such as inconsistency and moral ambivalence. 183 Cooperation is un-
evenly distributed and subject to variations based on locale. One 
defendant may receive greater benefits for a crime while another receives 
almost nothing. In addition, widespread cooperation is ethically prob-
lematic. Disloyalty is the center of cooperation, therefore, snitching en-
genders moral ambivalence. 184 Moreover, the reliability of accomplice 
witness testimony is sketchy, at best, because the incentives to lie are 
overwhelming.185 It is much safer to shift the blame onto the other party 
and avoid prosecution altogether. In addition, the practice seems to un-
dermine the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging unreliable 
testimony. When a witness seeks leniency in exchange for testimony 
against the defendant, the prosecutor is tempted to leave credibility as-
sessments up to the jury. Many prosecutors may feel it is not their job to 
judge the truth of testimony, only if it will help their case. Justice De-
partment policies seem to encourage this approach. The Department's 
Principles of Federal Prosecution lists a range of "relevant considera-
tions" for determining whether to enter a plea agreement with a defen-
dant. These considerations include the defendant's willingness to coop-
erate, but do not include the prosecutor's degree of confidence that the 
. "II "f h I 186 witness WI test! y onest y. 
Another argument for the application of the statute is that the defen-
dant's right to have an even playing field may be just as important for the 
criminal justice system as the prosecutor's ability to exchange leniency 
L.J. 509, 515 (1999). 
181. /d. at 516 (quoting Supplemental Brief of the United States at 15-16, Singleton, 144 F. 3d 
1343 (No. 97-3178)). 
182. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1309. 
183. See Weinstein, supra note 30, at 563-64. 
184. See id. at 564. 
185. See id. at 565. 
186. See David A. Sklanksy, Starr, Singleton and the Prosecutors' Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 509, 528-29 (1999) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual§ 9-27.420 
(Prentice Hall 1987)). 
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for testimony. The defendant is at a severe disadvantage when he/she is 
up against testimony given in exchange for leniency. As the dissent in 
Singleton II noted, "ours is an adversarial legal system, and implicit in 
this system, which pits the government against the defendant in a court 
of law, is the notion of fair play."187 One might counter this idea with the 
fact that courts allow evidence of the exchange for the purpose of im-
peaching the witness. However, at this point, the damage might have al-
ready been done. The witnesses' testimony is still available for the jury 
to hear. 
However, on the other hand, the ability of the prosecutors to gain 
necessary testimony for convictions is tantamount to the inherent incon-
sistencies and the different standards for prosecutors and defense attor-
neys. Prosecutors have different roles than defense attorneys. Prosecutors 
are not ordinary parties to a controversy. Rather, they are agents of a 
sovereignty whose interest is in achieving justice.188 
The most persuasive opinion is Judge Lucero's concurrence, perhaps 
because it can be seen as a middle ground that criticizes both the dissent 
and the majority. Judge Lucero's opinion takes into consideration the 
idea that the majority's opinion may lead to prosecutorial misconduct. It 
also impliedly criticizes the dissent's dismissal of other statutes that al-
low the exchange of something of value for testimony. His statutory con-
struction provides for limits on the something of value that prosecutors 
may offer to prospective cooperating witnesses. Although the more spe-
cific statutes override the witness gratuity statute, prosecutors are not ab-
solved of responsibility. However, a major problem of Judge Lucero's 
concurrence is that the specific statutes do not expressly address dealing 
prior to sentencing. His concurrence addresses the idea that one can infer 
intent from the various other statutes. For plain language judges and 
scholars, this idea is problematic. If the statutes do not expressly address 
the issue of exchanging leniency for testimony prior to sentencing, 
prosecutors can find a way to get around them. Although Judge Lucero's 
opinion does not address the bigger issue of encouraging unreliable tes-
timony, the opinion does dispense with the problem of applying the stat-
ute to federal prosecutors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This will not be the last time this issue is brought before the courts. 
With the gravity of the implications of a negative outcome for federal 
187. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1314. 
188. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1347 (10"' Cir. 1998) (citing United States 
v. Burger, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
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prosecutors, the better solution would be for the legislature to address 
this problem. The courts struggle with congressional intent. They attempt 
to read meaning into congressional inaction and ambiguities. Allowing 
the legislature to re-word the statute may be the best approach to this 
problem. Even if the statute is not reworded, at some point Congress 
should address the practice of exchanging something of value for testi-
mony. There are a number of problems in relying on such testimony. The 
administration of justice must be fair and free from tainted testimony. Ei-
ther way, the best answer is for the legislature to protect the prosecutor's 
ability to obtain necessary testimony and eliminate the problem by re-
wording the statute. 
Melissa W. Rawlinson 
